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COMMENT
LAW, JUSTICE AND JURY WAIVER PROCEDURE IN
THE OHIO SUPREME COURT
The history of American freedom is, in no small measure,
the history of procedure.
JUSTICE FELIX FRANKFURTER
I
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ohio Supreme Court has recently dealt with two cases in
which it seemingly had a choice-do "justice" to the families of
the victims or uphold the law. The lines were clear-brutal mur-
derers, whose guilt have been proven to the satisfaction of the trial
courts, stood at the foot of the state high court. Between the defen-
dants and their punishment stood nothing but technicalities-a
missing time-stamp on a piece of paper in one case, and the miss-
ing paper from the defendant's file in the other. The families of
the victims pleaded for the court to hand out justice, but the law
seemed clear-the defendants would have to be given another trial.
Faced with these decisions, the court waffled. In State ex rel.
Larkins v. Baker,2 the court refused the defendant's plea and up-
held the conviction, holding that although Larkins's form that
waived his right to a jury trial had not been made a part of the
record, this did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear
the case without a jury. In State v. Pless,3 however, the court
chose the opposite route, granting a new trial to Carroll Dean
1. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945).
2. 653 N.E.2d 701 (Ohio 1995).
3. 658 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio 1996).
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Pless, who had been convicted for shooting his former girlfriend in
a case that caused such outrage that it inspired the state's anti-
stalking law. The latter decision was based on the fact that
Pless's jury waiver form, which clearly had been signed, had not
been filed or made part of the record of the case.'
This Comment takes the position that the majority's attempt in
Pless to reconcile the two decisions was in vain. However, it also
will argue that the Pless decision was still correct because in that
case, the court clearly upheld the letter of the law regardless of the
price of its decision. This stand may have been unpopular, but it
was the only correct decision that could have been made. Revers-
ing Pless's conviction and ordering a new trial was the right deci-
sion: the statute at issue in the case clearly required the trial court
to make Pless's waiver of his right to a jury trial a part of the
case's record; a substantial compliance reading of the statute would
lead to an improper role for the courts; Ohio precedent supported
the Pless decision; and a contrary decision could cause uncertainty
for appellate courts as to whether a waiver had been withdrawn.
Thus, Pless was a better-reasoned decision than Larkins despite the
Pless court's unwillingness to recognize the fact that the two cases
are indistinguishable.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ohio Revised Code § 2945.05
Both the United States Constitution6 and Ohio's constitution7
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial in cases
involving serious offenses. However, defendants often believe it is
in their best interest to waive that right and have the case tried
before a judge or panel of judges! Neither the federal nor the
4. T.C. Brown, Stalking Murderer Seeks New Trial, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct.
25, 1995, at 4-B.
5. See Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 767-68.
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring that the trial of all crimes be by jury
except in cases of impeachment); id. amend. VI (assuring the right of a trial by jury "[in
all criminal prosecutions"); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1968) (holding that
cases involving petty offenses may be tried without a jury).
7. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10 (assuring the right to a jury trial for capital offenses and
where conviction can result in imprisonment); id. art. I, § 5 (stating that "[t]he right of
trial by jury shall be inviolate").
8. See, e.g., Paul Mancino, III, Jury Waiver in Capital Cases: An Assessment of the
Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Standard, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 605, 607-08 (1991)
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state constitutional provisions preclude defendants from waiving the
right to a jury trial9 nor the legislature from proscribing the man-
ner in which that waiver is to take place.' Thus, the Ohio legisla-
ture in 1953 enacted Ohio Revised Code § 2945.05, the statute at
issue in Larkins and Pless. It states as follows:
In all criminal cases pending in courts of record in this
state, the defendant may waive a trial by jury and be tried
by the court without a jury. Such waiver by a defendant,
shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, and filed in
said cause and made a part of the record thereof...
Such waiver of trial by jury must be made in open
court after the defendant has been arraigned and has had
opportunity to consult with counsel. Such waiver may be
withdrawn by the defendant at any time before the com-
mencement of the trial."
Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(A) generally allows a
waiver of the right to a jury trial in "serious offense cases" so
long as the defendant "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waive[s] in writing his right to trial by jury."'2 It also allows a
waiver during a trial so long as the court and prosecutor ap-
prove. 3  To the extent that this rule is inconsistent with
§ 2945.05, though, the statute supersedes the rule. 4 Thus, while
(stating that the reasons a defendant may choose to waive the right to a jury trial may
include extensive pretrial publicity, the effect of a particularly heinous crime, the
defendant's fear that his or her race, religion, or prior criminal record may prejudice the
jury, and the defendant's wish to shorten the length of the trial).
9. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (holding that a defendant's
waiver of a jury trial does not violate Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution); State ex
rel. Warner v. Baer, 134 N.E. 786, 793-94 (Ohio 1921) (holding that the state
constitution's guarantee of the right to a jury trial did not prohibit a defendant from
agreeing to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors because the constitutional protections
may be waived).
10. State v. Brown, 28 Ohio Op. 536, 537-38 (C.P. 1944) (upholding the power of the
legislature "to make failure to demand a jury a waiver of the right to trial by jury").
11. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.05 (Baldwin 1995). The statute also proscribes the
language of the written waiver form:
It shall be entitled in the court and cause, and in substance as follows: "I
__ , defendant in the above cause, hereby voluntarily waive and relin-
quish my right to a trial by jury, and elect to be tried by a Judge of the
Court in which the said cause may be pending. I fully understand that under
the laws of this state, I have a constitutional right to a trial by jury."
Id.
12. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 23(A).
13. Id.
14. State v. Hurt, No. 58882, 1991 WL 180061, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App., Sept. 12,
111519961
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Rule 23(A) does not require the waiver to be filed and made part
of the defendant's case, these steps are nonetheless required by the
statute.15 In order to waive the right to a jury trial, the statute's
procedure must be followed. 6
The requirements for waiving the right to a jury trial are sup-
plemented by § 2945.06, which provides that where "a defendant
waives his right to trial by jury and elects to be tried by the court
under [§ 2945.05], any judge of the court in which the cause is
pending shall proceed to hear, try, and determine the cause in
accordance with the rules and in like manner as if the cause were
being tried before a jury."'7 The two statutes are to be read to-
gether-§ 2945.06 limits a court's jurisdiction to try cases without
a jury to those in which the waiver complies with § 2945.05.1'
B. Precedent
In 1979, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its first major decision
as to the flexibility of the § 2945.05 requirements. In State v.
Tate,'9 the defendant had been charged with complicity in criminal
damaging in connection with a teachers' strike, and his attorney
had properly filed a written demand for a jury trial.2' While there
was some evidence that Tate's attorney had orally waived Tate's
right to a jury trial,2 no oral or written waiver appeared on the
record." Tate was found guilty by the trial judge, and on appeal
argued that he had never waived his right to a jury trial.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed Tate's conviction because
the trial court had not complied with § 2945.05.' Rejecting the
state's argument that Tate had waived his jury trial right by silent-
ly acquiescing to a bench trial, the court held that "it must appear
of record that [the] defendant waived this right in writing in the
manner provided by R.C. 2945.05, in order for the trial court to
1991), appeal dismissed, 585 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 1992).
15. See id.
16. State v. Harris, 596 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
17. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.06 (Baldwin 1995).
18. State v. McCoy, 269 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969).
19. 391 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979).
20. Id. at 738. The requirements of a demand for a jury trial are set forth in OHIO R.
CRIM. P. 23(A).
21. The state appellate court had been presented with affidavits that the attorney had
orally waived the right to a jury trial during a discussion with the judge. Tate, 391
N.E.2d at 739 n.1.
22. Id. at 739.
23. Id. at 740.
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have jurisdiction to try the defendant without a jury. 24
However, the Tate decision left open the question whether
strict compliance with all the requirements of § 2945.05 is actually
necessary for a defendant to validly waive his or her right to a
jury trial. Lower courts are split on the issue; some courts uphold
convictions that were tried without a jury even though the defen-
dant had not actually met a requirement such as executing the
waiver in open court,' while other courts insist on strict compli-
ance with the terms of the statute.'
Fifteen years after Tate, the Ohio Supreme Court took the
rationale of Tate one step further in State ex reL Jackson v.
Dallman.' The defendant in that case signed a written waiver
form; however, the waiver was never filed or made part of the
record2 The state appellate court denied the defendant's writ for
habeas relief, finding that § 2945.05 had been complied with, but
the Ohio Supreme Court reversed. The majority's opinion supplied
strong language that the court would not tolerate deviations from
the requirements of § 2945.05: "There must be strict compliance
with R.C. 2945.05 for there to be a waiver of a right to a jury
trial; where the record does not reflect strict compliance, the trial
court is without jurisdiction to try the defendant without a jury."29
The court thus granted the defendant habeas relief, as the trial
court had been without jurisdiction to try him without a jury."
The law after DaIlman thus seemed clear-nothing less than strict
compliance with § 2945.05 would waive a defendant's right to a
jury trial.
24. Id. at 738.
25. See, e.g., State v. Dozier, No. 6022, (Ohio Ct. App. May 6, 1980) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohcts file); State v. Phelps, No. 6753 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1981) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohcts file).
26. See, e.g., City of Elyria v. Kacur, C.A. No. 3760, 1985 WL 10683 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 17, 1985); State v. Hittle, Nos. 80-CA46, 80-CA47, 1981 WL 2705 (Ohio Ct. App.
March 3, 1981).
27. 638 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1994).
28. See id. at 564 (reviewing the court of appeal's determination that despite the de-
fendant Jackson's claim that he had never signed a waiver form, the evidence indicated
that he had done so.)
29. Id. at 565.
30. Id.
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C. The Cases at Issue
1. State ex. rel Larkins v. Baker
The bright lines the court had seemingly drawn became
blurred, however, in Larkins. Ronald Larkins, or "Road Dog," was
indicted in 1981 for the aggravated murder of Lawrence Botnick
and the attempted murder of Botnick's son while robbing the
Botnicks' pawn shop.31 Larkins signed a written waiver of his
right to a jury trial in open court, and the waiver was physically
placed in his case file. However, according to the trial judge's
normal practice, the document was not stamped as being "Received
for Filing" by the trial court clerk, nor was it reflected in the
criminal docket.32 The trial judge heard the case without a jury,
found Larkins guilty, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.33
Larkins later sought habeas relief, claiming that the trial court
judge had been without jurisdiction to try him because the waiver
did not strictly comply with § 2945.05." The court of appeals
granted him a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Larkins's waiver
did not strictly comply with § 2945.05, as required by Dallman"
The appellate court ruled that the document's "mere physical pres-
ence in the case file does not meet the requirement of being filed
and made a part of the record."36 Thus, as in Dallman, the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case without a jury.37
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and stated that while the
trial court did not strictly comply with the statute, the "extraordi-
nary relief in the nature of habeas corpus is not warranted. The
failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05 under the circumstanc-
es here is neither a jurisdictional defect nor an error for which no
adequate remedy at law exists."38 The court relied on § 2945.06
in reaching this decision, holding that under that statute Larkins did
in fact "waive[] his right to trial by jury and elect[ed] to be tried
31. State v. Larkins, Nos. 63760, 63761, 1993 WL 462884, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
10, 1993).
32. State ex rel. Larkins v. Baker, 653 N.E.2d at 701.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 701-02.
35. State ex rel. Larkins v. Baker, no. 94 CA 83, 1995 WL 42479, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 18, 1995).
36. Id. at *2.
37. Id. at *3.
38. Larkins, 653 N.E.2d at 702.
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by the court."39 Thus, while Larkins did not technically comply
with the requirements for a jury waiver under § 2945.05, the court
held he did nonetheless meet the requirements of § 2945.06 be-
cause he waived his right to a jury trial and elected to be tried by
the court under § 2 9 45.06 .'4 The trial court's error in failing to
time stamp the waiver did not change this fact and thus the trial
court had jurisdiction to try Larkins, even though the requirements
of § 2945.05 had not been met.4 ' Because the trial court had ju-
risdiction, the Ohio Supreme Court would not grant habeas re-
lief.42
The Larkins court also tried to distinguish the case at bar from
Tate and Dailman on the "unique" facts before it. Unlike Daliman,
Larkins's signed waiver had actually been placed in the file and
Larkins had stipulated that he had signed the waiver. Unlike Tate,
the relief requested in Larkins was habeas corpus, rather than a
direct appeal. Thus, the court decided to "limit" the holdings in
Tate and Dallman rather than to "force the victims of Larkins's
crimes 'to suffer through a new trial more than eight years after
the matter was closed."43
Two justices dissented, claiming that the majority interpreted
§ 2945.06 in a way "which appears to be at war with its terms." 44
The dissenters argued that § 2945.05 sets forth the requirements for
a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial; § 2945.06 merely states
that once these requirements are met, the trial judge may hear, try,
and decide the case as if it were being tried to a jury.45 Stating
that "[t]he right to a trial by jury is a fundamental tenet of our
justice system" and that "courts should indulge every reasonable
presumption against a waiver of that right," the dissenters thus
reasoned that the majority had provided no sufficient justification
for essentially eliminating the requirements that the waiver be filed
and made part of the record of the case.'
39. Id. at 703.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Larkins, 653 N.E.2d at 703 (quoting Guin, J. concurring in State ex rel. Larkins v.
Baker, no. 94 CA 83, 1995 WL 42479 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan, 18, 1995)).
44. Id. at 704 (Wright, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 705.
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2. State v. Pless
On July 11, 1991, Pless shot and killed Sherry Lockwood after
repeatedly stalking her.47 He went to her home, beat Lockwood,
and dragged her by her hair. Lockwood broke free and tried to run
out her front door, but Pless fired two shots into her head at close
range before she could escape. Pless then reportedly calmly walked
away with an "odd smile" on his face." Pless was indicted eleven
days later on six counts, including two counts of aggravated mur-
der.4
9
Pless then appeared in open court and voluntarily signed a
written waiver of his right to a jury trial. Trial judge Janet
Burnside questioned Pless extensively to ensure that Pless knew the
consequences of the waiver, that he had discussed it with his attor-
neys, and that he had signed the waiver voluntarily." Judge
Burnside read the waiver to Pless, and the transcript indicates that
Pless signed the form.5 Burnside, however, did not make the
waiver an official court order because she believed Ohio law only
required the proceedings to make note of the defendant signing the
waiver.52 A three-judge panel convicted Pless of aggravated mur-
der, aggravated burglary, kidnapping, intimidation of a witness, and
a firearm violation.53 The panel sentenced Pless to death.54
At the court of appeals, Pless raised nineteen assignments of
error. The court rejected each of them, and upheld Pless's convic-
tion and sentence." On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, Pless
raised a twentieth contention-that the three-judge panel had no
jurisdiction to try him because the written waiver of his right to a
jury trial was never filed and made part of the record of the
case.
56
Five justices on the seven-member court agreed with this argu-
47. State v. Pless, 658 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio 1996).
48. T.C. Brown, Kin Call Retrial in Stalking Case a "Nightmare," PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Jan. 21, 1996, at 4B.
49. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 766.
50. See id. at 766-67 n.2 (setting forth the transcript of the questioning).
51. Id. at 768 n.2 (quoting Judge Burnside asking Pless whether he signed the waiver,
and Pless responded, "Yes, I did").
52. Brown, supra note 48, at 4B.
53. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 767-68.
54. Brown, supra note 48, at 4B.
55. State v. Pless, No. 63477, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4467 (Ohio CL App. Sept. 29,
1994).
56. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 768-69.
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ment. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Andrew Douglas,
saw § 2945.05 as a clear and explicit requirement for a waiver of
the right to a jury trial to be effective, and reasoned that since the
requirement of making the written waiver part of the record was
not met in Pless's case, the panel was without jurisdiction to try
and convict him. 7 "Absent strict compliance with R.C. 2945.05,"
Justice Douglas wrote, "a trial court lacks jurisdiction to try the
defendant without a jury."58
The majority saw Tate and Dalman as clear precedent for the
proposition that strict compliance with § 2945.05 is necessary for a
waiver to be effective. Larkins, according to the majority, created a
limited exception to the strict compliance rule, but that exception
was limited to habeas corpus situations.59 In addition, the court
held that Larkins presented "unique circumstances" of a waiver that
had actually been physically included in the case file, whereas in
Pless the written document had never been included in the file.'
Thus, because of the plain language of the statute and precedent
requiring strict compliance with the statute, the majority stated it
had no choice but to reverse Pless's conviction.6'
The majority however did not do so without expressing some
regret. It acknowledged that "our decision today might not be well
received," and that Pless "is a brutal killer."62 In a statement to
the media after the decision, Justice Douglas acknowledged that the
decision was not easy: "Had there been any room for interpretation
in that statute I would have done so. My heart goes out to the
family [of Lockwood]. There is no question in my mind [Pless] is
a brutal killer who should never be released from confinement."'63
Justice Douglas and the majority held fast to the "plain lan-
guage" of § 2945.05, though, because "[i]f we were to ignore this
statute, as some would have us do, then, henceforth, no clear and
unambiguous statute would be safe from a 'substantial compliance'
interpretation."' Thus, the court was "constrained to enforce the
statute as written. '
57. Id. at 770.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 770.
62. Id.
63. Brown, supra note 48, at 4B.
64. Pkss, 658 N.E.2d at 770.
65. Id.
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In her concurrence joined by four justices from the majority,
Justice Alice Robie Resnick agreed that § 2945.05 is clear and
required a reversal of Pless's conviction, but also focused on the
potential abuses that could occur should the court allow anything
less than strict compliance with the statute. Since a defendant may
withdraw a waiver of the right to a jury trial,' Justice Resnick
stated that the requirement of the written document in the file is
necessary to make sure a defendant did not change his mind. An
indication on a transcript of the waiver cannot be sufficient, Justice
Resnick stated, because "we cannot be absolutely sure that, after
the court had taken the signed waiver form from appellant and
written out the journal entry and after the court reporter had
packed up and left, appellant did not change his mind and ask that
the waiver form be destroyed or returned to him."'67
Justice Resnick also stressed the concern of the majority that
should an exception to the statute be allowed in this case, many
more exceptions would arise in the future because of overcrowded
dockets and overworked court personnel. 8 Should the court sanc-
tion such a "shortcut," Justice Resnick reasoned, the practice "will
be taken more and more as acceptable practice and without follow-
ing the requirements that the General Assembly wrote into the
law."69 In addition, Justice Resnick wrote that protecting Pless's
rights were particularly important because he was sentenced to
death.70
Justices Cook and Pfeifer dissented, reading Ohio precedent
differently than the majority. The dissenters argued that Dallman
and Tate were not controlling because in neither of those cases did
the trial court record affirmatively reflect that the defendant volun-
tarily waived the right to a jury trial.7 In the dissent's view,
Larkins governed this situation because it rejected a strict compli-
ance interpretation of § 2945.05.72 Unlike the majority, the dissent
did not see that Larkins was "limited to habeas corpus actions or
that the result in Larkins was dictated by the written waiver's
66. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.05 (Baldwin 1995) ("Such waiver may be
withdrawn by the defendant at any time before the commencement of the trial.").
67. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 771 (Resnick, J., concurring).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (Cook, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
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presence in the trial court's case file."" Thus, just as Larkins's
missing time-stamped copy of his waiver was not fatal in that case,
according to the dissenters, neither should Pless's missing copy of
his written waiver be fatal.74
III. THE Two CASES ARE IRRECONCILABLE
In requiring strict compliance with the requirements of
§ 2945.05, the Pless court had the right approach, but it failed to
acknowledge the significance of the track it chose. The Larkins and
Pless decisions are simply not reconcilable because the former
clearly allows a "substantial compliance" exception to the applica-
tion of § 2945.05, while the latter does not. Thus, the Pless deci-
sion rejects the court's holding in Larkins just one year earlier, and
represents a bold step toward strict compliance.
Larkins, as explained above,75 rested on two issues. First, the
Larkins court held that while strict compliance with § 2945.05 was
required under Tate and Dallman, failure of the trial court to file a
waiver and make it part of the record does not affect its jurisdic-
tion to hear the case76 The rationale for this holding was that the
defendant in such an instance has "waived" his right to a jury trial
under § 2945.06 despite the court's failure to comply with
§ 2945.05." Second, the Larkins court stated that it was dealing
with "unique circumstances" because a written waiver had physical-
ly been placed in the record (although it had not been time-
stamped) and the case involved habeas review rather than a direct
appeal.' To whatever extent Tate and Dallman remained inconsis-
tent with the Larkins decision, the Pless court "limited" those hold-
ings.7
9
Larkins and Pless are hopelessly inconsistent, and the Pless
court's efforts to distinguish the two are not persuasive. The Pless
court asserted that "the sole proposition for which Larkins stands is
that a violation of R.C. 2945.05 is not the proper subject for habe-
73. Id. at 772.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
76. Larkins, 653 N.E.2d at 702 (holding additionally that Larkins could have raised the
trial court's error on direct appeal).
77. Id. at 703.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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as corpus relief.8  However, nothing within the Larkins decision
supports such a limited reading of the case. The Larkins court held
that despite the trial court's failure to strictly comply with the
mandates of § 2945.05, the trial court nonetheless had jurisdiction
to hear the case because the defendant had attempted to waive his
right to a jury trial, giving the trial court jurisdiction under
§ 2945.06. "Jurisdiction" cannot be used in one way for the basis
of a habeas corpus ruling, yet remain intact for all other purpos-
es.8' Either the trial court has jurisdiction even if it fails to com-
ply with § 2945.05, or it does not. If it does, both defendant's
habeas and direct appeals should fail. If it does not, both proceed-
ings should succeed, and defendants should be given new trials.
Thus, Larkins must apply in all cases, whether they involve a
direct appeal or a habeas corpus petition.
The "unique circumstances" of Larkins do not distinguish it
from Pless. The presence of the written document in Larkins is not
different than the transcript's indication that a waiver was signed in
Pless. Both situations involve violations of § 2945.05's third and
fourth requirements-that the waiver form be filed and made part
of the record of the case. If Larkins is the law, then either Pless's
conviction should have been allowed to stand on the same "sub-
stantial compliance" grounds, or the court should have stated that
Pless's situations did not meet the substantial compliance exception.
Instead, the court explicitly endorsed Dallman's strict compliance
requirement. Substantial compliance and strict compliance cannot
both be the law, thus, the Larkins and Pless decisions are inconsis-
tent.
80. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 770 (emphasis in original).
81. It is true that a court generally will not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless (1)
the trial court violated the defendant's rights in a manner that is not otherwise remedial
at law and (2) the violation of the defendant's rights are so great as to deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction to try and sentence the case. State v. Perry, 226 N.E.2d 104, 107
(Ohio 1967). In this manner, the Larkins court may have used "jurisdiction" to refer to
the seriousness of the violation of the defendant's rights, rather than the term as it is
normally used. However, nothing in the Larkins decision explicitly supports such a limited
view of the term "jurisdiction," and thus it must be assumed that the Larkins court meant
that a trial court had jurisdiction to hear a case despite the lack of strict compliance with
§ 2945.06.
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IV. STRICT COMPLIANCE IS THE BETTER APPROACH
Although Pless was not supported by Larkins, the Pless court
nevertheless reached the better conclusion. The Pless majority was
clearly inclined to deny Pless's appeal if the law could be con-
strued so as to support the state's position, but it found four insur-
mountable obstacles to this outcome. First, the court believed the
plain language of § 2945.05 left no such loophole available. Sec-
ond, because the language of the statute was clear, the court be-
lieved that it should not ignore or rewrite the statute's require-
ments. In addition, the court rested its decision on Ohio precedent
as set forth in Tate and Dallman. Finally, the court (as reflected in
Justice Resnick's concurring opinion) was concerned about the
problem of how to determine whether a defendant had withdrawn
his or her waiver if no written waiver had been made part of the
record.
The Pless decision was correct because of the four justifica-
tions set forth by the court.' In addition, even if the court could
have legally justified the decision, "justice" did not clearly demand
upholding Pless's conviction. Thus, the decision, while understand-
ably disappointing to Sherry Lockwood's family, was the right one
to be made.
A. Plain Language
The language of O.R.C. § 2945.05, as the majority in Pless
recognized, is clear as to what is required to waive a right to a
jury trial, and, as Justice Resnick noted, it "does not provide for
substantial compliance."83 The statute explicitly states that a waiv-
er of a right to a jury trial shall be (1) in writing, (2) signed by
the defendant, (3) filed in said cause, and (4) made a part of the
record of the case. Additionally, it states that the waiver must be
made in open court after the defendant has been arraigned and has
had the chance to meet with his or her attorney. It contains no
other language to indicate that some other method of waiver would
be effective, or that a waiver need not meet all the requirements of
the statute.
82. An additional justification exists for the court's decision in Pless, but while impor-
tant, does not merit extensive consideration. As Justice Resnick's concurrence observed,
Pless was sentenced to the death penalty. Thus, it is especially important that his right to
a jury trial be protected. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 771 (Resnick, J., concurring).
83. Id.
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The waiver in Pless did not comply with the plain language of
the statute. Pless's written waiver form was neither "filed" nor
made a part of the record" of the case.84 An indication on a
transcript is not the same as filing the actual form and making it
part of the record, and the statute does not say that statements
about the waiver may be filed and made part of the record through
the court's transcript; it says that the waiver itself must be filed.
Thus, the trial court did not comply with the plain language of §
2945.05.
Those opposed to the Pless decision may argue that although
the statute does establish requirements for a waiver, the statute
does not prohibit other methods for compliance. In fact, some
federal appellate courts have reached this conclusion." In United
States v. Saadya,86 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that while
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) requires a waiver of the
right to a jury trial to be in writing, an exception to this require-
ment exists where the defendant personally gave express, knowing,
and intelligent consent to the waiver in open court."
This argument, though, is not persuasive under Ohio law. The
Ohio statute does not hint that alternative methods of waiver may
be valid; rather, it states that "[i]n all criminal cases pending in
courts of record in this state," a defendant may waive the right to
a jury trial, and that such waiver "shall" meet the four require-
ments set forth above.88 "Shall" is not a discretionary term; by its
general meaning it is "used in laws, regulations, or directives to
express what is mandatory."89 The federal cases did not have the
benefit of a statute clearly spelling out what steps are necessary to
effectively waive the right to a jury trial. Thus, the statute man-
dates that waivers be by the method it sets forth. The federal cases
allowing waivers by alternate methods than those proscribed, apart
from their lack of binding precedential value, deal not with a stat-
ute, but with a rule of procedure providing less clear guidelines;
Federal Rule 23(a) states only that defendants shall be tried by a
jury unless the right to a jury trial is waived in writing. Thus, the
84. Id. at 769.
85. See, e.g., United States. v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1432 (10th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 133 (1995).
86. 750 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 1420.
88. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.05 (Baldwin 1995).
89. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2085 (1986).
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lack of a clear legislative mandate distinguishes the few federal
cases that have allowed an alternate means of waiver"0 from the
situation in Pless.
Another possible argument against the "plain language" ratio-
nale for the Pless decision could be that the waiver in that case
met the spirit, although not the letter, of § 2945.05. The require-
ment that a defendant sign a written waiver exists to ensure that
the defendant's waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 91
Thus, in this case it could be argued that despite the technical
noncompliance with the statute's requirements, Pless's conviction
should be allowed to stand because the transcript of the question-
ing by the trial judge, combined with the undisputed fact that Pless
actually did sign a waiver, prove that his waiver was intelligent,
voluntary, and knowing.
The response to this argument is that it is the legislature that is
assigned the task of establishing our policy goals that comply with
broad constitutional mandates. Thus, since the Ohio legislature
chose to ensure the intelligence, voluntariness, and knowingness of
jury waivers by the four requirements of § 2945.05, it is not for
the courts to second-guess that decision unless the statute is uncon-
stitutional. The fact that a statute provides more hurdles than a rule
of criminal procedure or the Constitution requires does not make it
discretionary. The "spirit" of § 2945.05 was in its language. Be-
cause it clearly intended all four requirements to be met in order
for a waiver to be valid, general rules of statutory interpretation
required the court to honor their plain meaning.' Pless correctly
did so.
Larkins, on the other hand, twisted the plain language of both
§ 2945.05 and § 2945.06. By holding that the latter statute grants
a trial court jurisdiction to hear a case without strict compliance
90. At least one circuit court has in fact expressly disallowed alternate means of waiv-
ing the right to a jury trial. See United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1012 (lth Cir.
1984), affd, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
91. State v. Griffin, 469 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
92. In DR. JOHN BELL & SIR GEORGE ENGLE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed.
1987), the authors quote the classical statement of the "plain meaning" or "literal" rule
from Justice Tindal's advice to the English House of Lords:
If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no
more can be necessary than to expound those words in that natural and ordi-
nary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the
intention of the lawgiver.
Id. at 14.
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with § 2945.05, the Larkins court ignored not only the plain lan-
guage of § 2945.05 but an explicit line of precedent requiring the
two statutes to be read in pari materia. Although the Larkins
dissent noted that the two statutes are to be read together, the
majority did not even address the issue. In addition, the Larkins
court's use of the fact that the words "shall have jurisdiction" had
been eliminated from § 2945.06 was not a valid reason for depart-
ing from § 2945.05's clear requirements. The newer version of
§ 2945.06 still requires compliance with § 2945.05 for the trial
judge to hear the case. Thus, as the Larkins dissent realized, the
Larkins majority "relie[d] on an interpretation of R.C. 2945.06
which appears to be at war with its terms." 94
B. The Problem with Substantial Compliance
Because the language of § 2945.05 was clear, the court was
bound to enforce it. Once this was established, though, the Pless
court could have fallen into a different but related trap-to what
extent it should enforce the language of the statute. To put the
issue differently, should the court follow Larkins and allow for
substantial compliance to satisfy the provisions of § 2945.05? The
Ohio Supreme Court answered this questions with a firm "no," and
this answer was the correct one. Reading a "substantial compli-
ance" loophole into the statute, as the court had done in Larkins,
would have thrust Ohio courts into an area in which they do not
belong, and would have given courts free reign to ignore the ex-
press will of the Ohio legislature. The Ohio Supreme Court was
wise to avoid this trap.
"Substantial compliance" is a phrase in vogue with many
courts. It allows a court to decide that a statute or contract has
been complied with when the "essential requirements" of the stat-
ute or contract have been met.95 Courts have used the rule fre-
quently in areas such as tax law,96 commercial law,97 and probate
law9" to validate actions that do not technically meet all the re-
93. See, e.g., United Tel. Co. v. Limbach, 643 N.E.2d 1129, 1131 (Ohio 1994) (quot-
ing Johnson's Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health, 567 N.E.2d 1018, 1025
(Ohio 1991)); State v. Smith, 174 N.E. 768, 768 (Ohio 1931).
94. Larkins, 653 N.E.2d at 704 (Wright, J., dissenting).
95. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (6th ed. 1991).
96. See generally Victoria A. Levin, The Substantial Compliance Doctrine in Tax Law:
Equity vs. Efficiency, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1587 (1993).
97. See generally Juliana J. Zekan, The Name Game--Playing to Win Under § 9-402
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 365 (1990).
98. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1990) (allowing writings intended as wills
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quirements of a statute.
Allowing Pless's conviction to stand because his waiver sub-
stantially complied with § 2945.05's requirements, however, would
be disastrous because it would force Ohio's courts to enter an area
in which it does not belong-rewriting legislation. Professor Fred-
erick Schauer gave this line of reasoning a name, calling it an
"argument from added authority."" The rationale is this: a court
should be careful about deciding a given issue, because once the
power to decide that issue is granted, it is possible the court could
decide another case against the position for which one argues.
Thus, everyone has an incentive to try to keep courts from decid-
ing the issue, because if the courts do not decide the issue, they
cannot decide it adversely to one's interests."°° Here, the Ohio
Supreme Court was unwilling to grant itself the power to read a
substantial compliance loophole into § 2945.05 because, as Justice
Douglas's majority opinion argued, "then, henceforth, no clear and
unambiguous statute would be safe from a 'substantial compliance'
interpretation."'0 ' The implicit problem is that under such a sys-
tem no one would be able to tell exactly what "the law" requires.
Thus, the court was making an "argument from added authority"
because it "proceeds from the assumption that even the unlikely
becomes more likely once jurisdiction is granted than it would
have been without that jurisdiction."'0
The Pless approach was wise because even though it is unlike-
ly that anything "bad" would happen (i.e. upholding a waiver that
truly was not voluntary, knowing, intelligent, or even actually
made) if the court assumed the power to read a substantial compli-
ance loophole into § 2945.05, the Pless court was unwilling to take
that chance. Nor should it have been. Pless did not involve a tax,
commercial, or probate statute, areas where the substantial compli-
ance doctrine is invoked frequently.0" This was a situation in
which constitutional liberties, and a life, were at stake. The impor-
tance of a jury trial has led Ohio courts to provide that "every
reasonable presumption should be made against the waiver, espe-
to be effective despite noncompliance with the statute's formal requirements).
99. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361, 367-68 (1985)
(setting forth the argument and distinguishing it from a slippery slope rationale).
100. Id.
101. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 770.
102. Schauer, supra note 99, at 368.
103. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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cially when it relates to a right or privilege deemed so valuable as
to be secured by the Constitution."'' 4 In such an instance, "sub-
stantial compliance" with the means the state legislature chose to
ensure a defendant's rights hardly grants the defendant "every
reasonable presumption" against the waiver.
Procedural rules do not exist simply for their own sake. As the
opening quote from Justice Frankfurter indicates, 05 procedure ex-
ists so that society has some means by which to determine the
rights of citizens. Where such procedure is clear, it must be fol-
lowed because, among other reasons, the legitimacy of the state
itself is at stake."° Achieving equality is also another important
goal of the criminal justice process, and this is accomplished in
part by ensuring that criminal procedure requirements apply to all
defendants. 7 If courts were to become involved in varying pro-
cedural requirements ex post facto to fit individual situations, the
legitimacy of the state would be compromised.
Criminal procedure in state courts is a matter generally left to
state legislatures.'08 Here, the Ohio legislature has chosen to en-
sure that jury waivers are made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently, by providing strict and extensive requirements for the pro-
cedure of such waiver. These requirements are not unreasonable,
given the central role the right to a jury trial plays in our soci-
ety.1°9 The best way to ensure that the safeguards built into
§ 2945.05 function is to enforce them, not to let the court pick and
chose which requirements to enforce in a given situation.
Larkins fell into the substantial compliance trap, and the results
could have created confusion if the court had not subsequently
decided Pless. While Larkins stated that its holding was limited to
the "unique circumstances" of that case, it left unclear exactly how
104. Simmons v. State, 79 N.E. 555, 557 (Ohio 1906).
105. See supra note I and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 1.6(g) (2d ed. 1992) ("[E]nsuring respect for individual dignity is viewed as essential in
obtaining public acceptance of the process and in promoting respect for the law it enforc-
es.").
107. Id. § 1.6(i).
108. See id. § 1.5(c) ("In most states, for most subjects, statutory provisions are the
dominant source of state law regulating the criminal justice process.").
109. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14, 156 (1968) (stating that
the right to a jury trial is "necessary to the Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty"
because "[p]roviding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers [gives]
him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge").
1130 [Vol. 46:1113
LAW, JUSTICE AND JURY WAIVER PROCEDURE
unique the case must be for a waiver to be sufficient to grant the
trial court jurisdiction to hear the case without a jury. Thus, as
Justice Wright's dissent in Larkins notes the case "leaves defen-
dants, lawyers, and the courts of this state with no meaningful test
for determining what errors with respect to jury trial waivers con-
stitute jurisdictional defects .... [Tihe majority's opinion, in essen-
tially rewriting R.C. 2945.06 .... embodies the very essence of
judicial legislation.""0
C. Precedent
The Ohio Supreme Court in Pless correctly read Ohio prece-
dent before Larkins as requiring Pless's conviction to be over-
turned. The case law clearly stated that strict compliance with §
2945.05's requirements is necessary for a waiver to be valid.
Tate held that once a defendant has the right to a jury trial and
demands a jury, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to try the
defendant without a jury unless the record reflects that "such de-
fendant waived this right in writing in the manner provided by
R.C. 2945.05.' Whatever room for ambiguity this statement left
open was subsequently closed. Dallman explicitly stated that
"[t]here must be strict compliance with R.C. 2945.05 for there to
be a waiver of a right to a jury trial; where the record does not
reflect strict compliance, the trial court is without jurisdiction to try
the defendant without a jury.""' It would be hard to state the
rule any clearer than this. Strict compliance alone satisfies the
requirements of § 2945.05."'
The factual differences in Pless, Daliman, and Tate do not
lessen their precedential value, contrary to the Pless dissenters'
opinion. It is true that in neither Daliman nor Tate did the trial
court transcript specifically reflect that the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily signed a written waiver."4 However,
110. Larkins, 653 N.E.2d at 705 (Wright, J., dissenting).
111. Tate, 391 N.E.2d at 740 (emphasis added).
112. Dallman, 638 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ohio 1994).
113. Other cases provide similar support. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 596 N.E.2d 563, 568
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("The rule today is, as expressed in R.C. 2945.05, that a right to
jury trial may be waived and an accused may submit to a trial by the court, but only
when very specific strict procedures are followed. There must be strict compliance with
R.C. 2945.05 for there to be a waiver of a right to jury trial."); State v. Fife, 137 N.E.2d
429, 431 (Ohio Ct. App 1954) ("[A trial court has jurisdiction] to try the defendant with-
out a jury only through a compliance with the statute requiring a written waiver, signed
by the defendant, filed in the cause, and made a part of the record." (emphasis in origi-
nal)).
114. In Tate, the court was presented with affidavits that Tate's attorney orally waived
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these facts are not sufficient to undermine Ohio precedent's support
for the Pless decision. While the defects in the Daliman and Tate
cases were more striking than those in Pless, the trial court's pro-
cedure in Pless still was defective-the written waiver was never
filed and made part of the record of the case. Because Dallman
and Tate require strict compliance with the requirements of
§ 2945.05, and because the trial court in Pless did not strictly
comply with the provisions of the statute, Dallman and Tate con-
trol, and required the result in Pless."s
Larkins failed to give proper weight to the Dallman and Tate
decisions. The court's effort to distinguish its situation from
Dallman on the grounds that Larkins involved a writ for the "ex-
traordinary relief' of habeas corpus was misguided, as Dallman
also was a habeas case. The fact that the defect in Larkins was
"unique"--the waiver in Larkins was physically placed in the file
but not filed with the clerk or made part of the record-also did
not distinguish it from Dallman any more than it distinguished it
from the situation in Pless. The requirements of § 2945.05 had not
been met in Larkins, and the "uniqueness" should be irrelevant.
The Larkins court's efforts to distinguish its decision on
§ 2945.06 was equally unpersuasive. Larkins, as explained
above, " 6 rested partly on the rationale that the noncompliance
with § 2945.05 caused by the trial court was not sufficient to
deprive the court of jurisdiction, as the term is used in § 2945.06.
Tate's right to a jury trial, but nothing on the trial court record indicated a written or
oral waiver. Tate, 391 N.E.2d at 739. In Dailman, the prosecutor stated that he witnessed
the defendant sign a waiver form, and submitted an uncertified copy of a waiver form
with the defendant's signature, but nothing on the transcript reflected the presence of a
written waiver. Dallman, 638 N.E.2d at 564.
115. Some lower Ohio courts had decided that, on similar facts to those in Pless, the
convictions could stand. These courts based their decisions on the factual differences be-
tween the facts in Tate and Dailman, and on the Larkins decision. See State v. Loesser,
No. 66762, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4607 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1995) (upholding con-
viction where defendant's waiver form was never filed); State v. Goodwin, No. 66951,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2540 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 1995) (distinguishing a situation in
which a defendant did not dispute signing a waiver from Dallman (Larkins had not yet
been decided)). However, although these decisions were not binding on the Supreme Court
of Ohio, their persuasiveness was diluted by the fact that at least one state appellate court
had followed the position adopted by Pless. See State v. McDonald, No. CA-9033, 1993
WL 271169 (Ohio Ct. App. July 6, 1993) (finding no trial court jurisdiction to try defen-
dant without a jury when defendant's waiver was never time-stamped and filed with the
clerk's office as part of the record). Thus, the lower court opinions siding with the
Larkins decision do not provide persuasive authority that the Pless decision was wrong.
116. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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Yet, Dallman and Tate were well aware of the existence and lan-
guage of § 2945.06, and still required strict compliance with
§ 2945.05's requirements for a valid waiver. The fact that the
jurisdiction issue was viewed in a habeas proceeding in Larkins
also does not matter, because the Larkins court did not limit its
holding to habeas review." 7 In addition, Dallman involved a ha-
beas corpus proceeding as well, and the court had not viewed
§ 2945.06 as having vested the trial court with jurisdiction in that
case. Thus, Pless is more consistent with Ohio precedent than
Larkins.
D. The Withdrawal Problem
Justice Resnick's opinion expressed not only a concern with
the plain language and subsequent interpretation of § 2945.05, but
also with a practical problem should the court have allowed a
substantial compliance reading of the statute. That concern focused
on how an appellate court would be able to conclusively determine
whether a defendant had waived his or her right to a jury trial if
no written waiver had ever been made part of a case's record.
Because the requirements of § 2945.05 were not strictly enforced
in Pless's case, Justice Resnick reasoned, the court had no way to
know if Pless asked for his waiver to be withdrawn after the ex-
change recorded on the transcript."' By requiring strict compli-
ance with § 2945.05's requirements, an appellate court will be
more likely to determine whether a defendant did withdraw his or
her waiver of the right to a jury trial. By allowing the waiver to
be effective under the Pless facts, the appellate court would have
been unable to determine if, after the court reporter had left, the
defendant had changed his mind and asked for the waiver form to
be destroyed or returned to him.
Strict compliance eliminates this concern. If § 2945.05 had
been strictly complied with, the appellate court would have had an
easier time doing so, because the trial judge could then either
return or destroy the waiver form to acknowledge this request. The
absence of the waiver form could then be prima facie evidence that
the defendant had withdrawn his or her waiver of the right to a
jury trial. In addition, formal compliance with § 2945.05 may lead
defense attorneys to be more formal in their attempts to withdraw
117. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
118. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 771 (Resnick, J., concurring).
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waivers completed under the section, because the presence of a
written form may lead defense attorneys to make a formal, written
motion to withdraw the waiver and demand a jury trial rather than
to make the request orally. Thus, strict compliance with
§ 2945.05's requirements will better ensure appellate court's ability
to enforce defendants' rights under the withdraw provision of
§ 2945.05.
E. "Justice"
Even given all of the above, the family of Sherry Lockwood
must have a difficult time accepting the Pless decision. Even if one
accepts that the law was clearly on Pless's side, overturning his
conviction and granting him a new trial could be a tough pill to
swallow because it can be seen as an unjust result. "9 The deci-
sion was, after all, based on a missing piece of paper, which even
the defendant did not deny existed, and the end result is a new
trial that will cost the state money and keep the door open on a
tragedy Sherry Lockwood's family undoubtedly would like to
close.
But injustice is not an absolute, fixed concept. 2 When
viewed differently, the Pless decision does not seem unjust at all,
but as the logical outcome of a mistake the trial court and prosecu-
tors made. Pless can be seen as a case of a killer getting away (for
the time being) with murder, but it is just as easily understood as
a case of a trial judge and prosecutor pleading with the judiciary to
cover their mistakes. The language of § 2945.05 explicitly states
what is required for a defendant's waiver of his or her right to a
jury trial. Even though Larkins seemingly allowed a "substantial
compliance" exception to the statute's requirements, and Judge
Burnside, along with many other Ohio judges, viewed § 2945.05's
119. This sense of "injustice" was described in Edmond Cahn's classic work The Sense
of Justice:
Here the sense of injustice attaches itself to the notion of desert. The law is
regarded as an implement for giving men what they deserve, balancing awards
and punishments in the scale of merit. . . .What it cannot stomach is the use
of law to raise up the guilty or to punish the innocent.
EDMOND CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIEW OF LAW 16-17
(1949).
120. See id. at 26 ("Is the sense of injustice right? Certainly not, if rightness means
conformity to some absolute and inflexible standard. There is nothing so easy or mechani-
cal about it.").
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requirements as less strict than Pless's determination,' there is
no good excuse for failing to comply with the statute's clear re-
quirements. Filing the waiver form and making it part of a case's
record should be a simple matter. By failing to do so, the prosecu-
tors and trial judge in Pless ran the risk that Pless's conviction
would be overturned, given the unsettled state of the law after
Larkins, DaIlman, and Tate. This gamble, not the Ohio Supreme
Court, caused the reversal of Pless's conviction.
In addition, the case does not impose a high price on society
and does have some benefits. Pless did not receive his freedom for
the prosecutors' and trial judge's mistake; he only received a new
trial. While Sherry Lockwood's daughter is understandably appre-
hensive about testifying against Pless," and a new trial will cost
money, it is unlikely Pless will ever be acquitted. Even the court
that granted him a new trial stated that Pless "is a brutal killer and
there is no question concerning his culpability" in the killing."
Pless is valuable for prosecutors and trial judges as well as defen-
dants, because now the requirements for an effective waiver of the
right to a jury trial are clearly delineated. Thus, while the decision
may seem harsh, it is clearly not "unjust."
Even if the decision were unjust, however, it was still correct.
Our system of criminal justice is not geared to do the victim jus-
tice, it is geared to do justice for all-especially the defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
If it is true that "tough facts make bad law," then the Ohio
Supreme Court should commend itself. While it allowed tough
facts to lead it down the wrong road in Larkins, it reversed this
trend in Pless. This was a key step toward closing the Pandora's
box of substantial compliance it had opened in Larkins. Substantial
compliance has no place in the interpretation of criminal procedure
statutes, especially statutes involving a waiver of one of the most
important rights criminal defendants have-the right to a jury trial.
The substantial compliance rule of Larkins had many problems: it
ran directly counter to the waiver statute's plain language; it would
have left those accused of crimes and those who sit on juries with
121. Brown, supra note 48, at 4B.
122. See Brown, supra note 48, at 4B (quoting the victim's daughter as stating, "I
don't want to have to go through this twice," and noting that she was scared that if
Pless is released, he may try to kill her).
123. Pless, 658 N.E.2d at 770.
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no way to know exactly as to when a jury waiver becomes effec-
tive; it defied Ohio precedent; and it would have eliminated an
important safeguard for defendants seeking to withdraw their waiv-
ers.
But the Pless court should have gone further and given itself
more credit for its decision. The court in Pless not only set forth a
valuable rule of strict compliance, but it had to contradict a case
decided just one year earlier. By not acknowledging that it was in
fact sticking to a strict compliance rule and overruling Larkins, it
left the Pandora's box open just a crack. Future decisions by the
Ohio Supreme Court may try to distinguish the cases, and the
substantial compliance rule may yet survive. If so, defendants,
prosecutors, courts, and society would be the worse for it.
JEREMY STONE WEBER
